Marvin Frankel: A Reformer Reassessed by Lynch, Gerard E.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2009 
Marvin Frankel: A Reformer Reassessed 
Gerard E. Lynch 
Columbia Law School, glynch@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gerard E. Lynch, Marvin Frankel: A Reformer Reassessed, 21 FED. SENT. REP. 235 (2009). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2156 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 
information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
Marvin Frankel: A Reformer Reassessed
Legal scholars and critics contribute to the development of
law in many ways: the comprehensive treatise, the heavily
footnoted law review article, the closely reasoned philo-
sophical essay, the econometric model, the theoretical
discourse, the bar association or American Law Institute
law reform project, among many others. Law professors
dedicate whole careers to perfecting one or more of these
forms. But few can claim to have had the impact on the
law, the system of criminal justice, and the lives of hun-
dreds of thousands of criminal defendants that Marvin
Frankel had with one thin volume addressed to "literate
citizens-not primarily lawyers and judges, but not
excluding them."' The book, of course, was Criminal Sen-
tences: Law without Order. My paperback copy, purchased
when I was a law student shortly after it came out, runs
only to 124 pages, but it spurred a movement that ulti-
mately affected sentencing practice across America. 2
It's worth taking a minute to remind younger readers
who Marvin Frankel was,3 because who he was has a lot to
do with the nature and success of his book. Frankel was
what used to be called a "lion of the bar"-a lawyer with a
distinguished and varied career, much of it devoted to the
lucrative private practice of law combined with leadership
in establishment law reform activities. Like many great
lawyers, he first made his mark as a brilliant student:
after growing up in Philip Roth's Newark, working his
way through Queens College, and serving in the military
during World War II, he was a star student at Columbia
Law School, and editor in chief of the Columbia Law
Review.4
His distinguished resum6 included a stint in the Solici-
tor General's Office, a period as a legal academic, a
relatively short tenure as a federal district judge, and the
private practice of law in two major New York law firms,
one of which still carries his name.5 He wrote a number of
books and many artides on legal topics, and was always a
thoughtful commentator on legal issues, but he was not
primarily a professional scholar. In fact, his time as a full-
time tenured faculty member at Columbia Law School
lasted only three years, before he was appointed to the fed-
eral bench on the recommendation of Senator Robert
Kennedy in 1965. His production while a professor was
decidedly quirky: his maiden scholarly venture was a study
of ten years' worth of the contents of the official journal of
the Alabama state bar.
6
Though Frankel's academic sojourn, penchant for writ-
ing, and fierce intelligence marked him as an intellectual
among lawyers, he spent the bulk of his life in the world,
as lawyer and judge. Even the federal bench proved insuf-
ficiently challenging to hold him; after thirteen years on
the bench, he resigned to return to the practice of law,
where he spent the rest of his long career. Having litigated
an appellate case against him, I can attest that he was a
shrewd and persuasive advocate, but you needn't take my
word for it: Frankel argued more than twenty cases in the
United States Supreme Court, the first as a young assis-
tant solicitor general in 19527 and the last, from the
wheelchair to which advanced-stage cancer confined him,
almost exactly fifty years later, just eleven days before he
died in March 2002.8
Frankel, then, was a legal polymath. But certain unify-
ing characteristics of his career came together in his book
on sentencing. Frankel was not only very smart, but-
despite a lifetime at the heart of the legal
establishment-he possessed an outsider's willingness to
challenge the conventional wisdom. Lawyers, being
trained to operate within the existing legal system, are pro-
fessionally conservative and disinclined to radical change.
Frankel, however, combined the intellectual's commit-
ment to rigorous analysis with the tough skepticism of a
kid from the streets of New York's periphery.
The result, as his proteg6, coauthor, and eventual part-
ner Gary Naftalis reminds us, was a series of books that
.never reflexively accepted the status quo, [but] scrutinized
legal institutions with a thoughtful and skeptical eye."9
Challenging the sentencing system, the grand jury,0 and
the adversarial system itself," Frankel was not one to
accept that things should be done a certain way simply
because no one could remember a time when they were
done otherwise, or because ritual praise for the existing
order is a persistent convention of the existing order. For
all his skepticism, however, Frankel was also an idealist,
who believed that the purpose of law was to secure justice
and that the role of lawyers was to advance the rule of law.
Nevertheless, Frankel was not just an intellectual, but a
practitioner deeply grounded in the way things were done.
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He could see through the ritual praise not only because he
had a skeptical, inquiring mind but also because he was
familiar with how the system actually worked, on a day-to-
day level, and not merely with the platitudes or theories of
those who described its ideal form. And, finally, Frankel
was a superb advocate. Having arrived at a diagnosis of
what was wrong with the system and a prescription for its
cure, he could bring together his arguments in elegant
and forceful prose that would sweep away opposition.
Which brings us to his little book. By now, the sub-
stance of his argument is familiar. When Frankel wrote,
judges were accorded broad and uncontrolled discretion
over sentencing. That discretion was the product of a reha-
bilitationist penal philosophy with roots deep in the early
Republic, but which came to full fruition in the progres-
sive era. Criminal punishment was designed largely for
the utilitarian end of reducing crime, by incapacitating
dangerous offenders until they could be reformed and
made safe to return to society.
If this was the goal, however, the particular offense for
which a defendant stood to be punished was at best indi-
rectly relevant to the sentencing process. A murderer
likely should receive a longer sentence than a shoplifter,
but more because his crime showed him more likely to be
dangerous than because he committed a greater wrong.
The true determinant of any offender's sentence should be
a prediction of how long he needed to be incarcerated in
order to be reformed, not the seriousness of his offense
per se, and such a prediction logically had to be based on a
variety of often intangible factors about his background
and character, in which the specific criminal conduct of
which he had been convicted was merely one among
many considerations. To properly tailor punishment to the
offender, sentences had to be discretionary rather than
mandatory, to enable the judge to select a correct sentence
rather than to impose by rote a tariff attached to a particu-
lar crime, and largely indeterminate in form, to give the
penal authorities the ability to adjust the sentence to
account for the prisoner's actual, as opposed to predicted,
progress in rehabilitation.
But if this was the theory of the system, Frankel's eye
for reality enabled him to see that its practical implemen-
tation created deep problems. Lack of resources and the
absence of an effective technology of character reforma-
tion made the goal of reforming prisoners elusive; the
rehabilitationist rhetoric of the system often masked more
nakedly punitive practices. Moreover, and this was
Frankel's central observation, the open-ended discretion
given to judges meant that no effective legal rules gov-
erned the sentences imposed. Penal statutes typically
specified extremely harsh maximum sentences, but no
minimums, so that anything from probation to twenty-five
years in prison was a legal sentence for an armed bank
robber under federal law.
The law did not require judges even to state reasons for
their sentences, and there was essentially no appellate
review of the reasonableness of the sentencing judge's
choice. If a judge did bother to state reasons for his sen-
tence, virtually any reason short of overt invidious
discrimination would do; while the rehabilitationist phi-
losophy may have dictated the design of the system, no
individual judge was required to subscribe to it, and many
did not. Judges could, and did, vary considerably in
whether they were tough or lenient; in the extent to which
they believed in reform or retribution; in their views on
whether they believed that particular offenses were grave
or minor and in whether they regarded such factors as
poverty or drug addiction as extenuating circumstances or
markers of likely recidivism.
Frankel was horrified by these aspects of the system,
and rightly so. He argued forcefully that "a government of
laws, not of men" deserved better.- His basic point was
impossible to argue with: "the almost wholly unchecked
and sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning
of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that
professes devotion to the rule of law."3 He then proceeded
to make that point in a devastating forty-five-page brief.
The basic building blocks of his argument are simple, and,
once assembled, obvious.
Penal codes criminalize too wide a range of behavior
and prescribe wide ranges of potential punishment for
offenses (and often are themselves internally inconsistent
and irrational with respect to the maximum sentences pre-
scribed for different offenses). Judges are not selected for
any expertise relevant to sentencing, vary widely both in
their qualities of mind and heart and in their philosophies
and approaches to punishment, and are conditioned by
the absence of binding legal principles to spend less time
and intellectual energy on sentencing than on other legal
issues. The procedures applicable at sentencing, with facts
collected by probation officers from hearsay sources, an
absence of legal standards and controls, and the injection
of irrelevant or culturally biased material, create unreliable
and discriminatory results. The absence of a requirement
that reasons be stated removes any possibility of criticizing
or even understanding what is happening, and removes
any possibility of transparency, accountability, or rational-
ity from the process.
Frankel does not stop, however, with a critique of the
system. He proposes not a "solution" to the "problem"
identified in the first part of the book, but a series of "pal-
liatives, remedies, and directions of hope."4 He begins,
characteristically, by noting that, for all their deficiencies,
sentencing must remain the province of judges and
lawyers, and that a large part of the solution must be the
application of law to the sentencing process.' 5 The prob-
lem with the system is not its domination by lawyers, but
the failure of lawyers to make use of their characteristic
virtues of principle and reason. The problem with tradi-
tional sentencing, in substantial part, is that these features
are absent: "The judgment is swift because the process of
reaching it is not reflective or orderly. The court renders
no 'opinion' because it has not followed the rational steps
required to create one."'6 That must change. Judges must
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begin to think rationally about sentencing, according to
rules and principles.
The idiosyncratic and impulsive qualities of sentencing
fostered by excessive discretion can perhaps be countered
by "sentencing institutes," in which judges speak to each
other about sentencing practices, or by shifting sentencing
from individual judges to sentencing panels or mixed tri-
bunals. A requirement that sentencing judges state their
reasons, coupled with appellate review of sentencing deci-
sions, could begin to develop a principled approach to
sentencing by traditional common-law methods.'7 But
these palliatives, while improvements on the system then
in place, are not sufficient. Legislative action is required,
and more dramatic change is necessary. 8
As one rereads the book today, in light of the dramatic
changes that it ultimately brought about, particularly in
the federal system, it is remarkable to remember that the
proposal for sentencing guidelines comes only at the very
end of the book and is put forward in rather a modest way.
Frankel begins with an indictment of the indeterminate
sentence, in the sense of "a prison sentence for which the
precise term of confinement is not known on the day of
judgment but will be subject within a substantial range to
the later decision of a parole board or some comparable
agency."' 9 While indeterminate sentencing and judicial
discretion are related in their connection to rehabilitation-
ist penal philosophy and in their reliance on the discretion
of officials (parole boards and judges, respectively), the
institution of parole is analytically independent of the judi-
cial discretion that had been the primary focus of Frankel's
criticism in the first part of the book: a jurisdiction could
have determinate sentences selected by judges exercising
discretion within a wide range of alternatives. But the
attack on parole and indeterminacy was to play an impor-
tant role in the overall pattern of sentencing reform that
Frankel successfully advocated. Like the attack on judicial
discretion, the attack on parole discretion was based on
Frankel's belief in orderly, predictable outcomes based on
rules designed to control discriminatory and arbitrary
decision makers.
Finally, in the last twenty pages of the book, come
Frankel's most far-reaching prescriptive recommenda-
tions. The legislature should take control of sentencing,
defining more clearly the purposes to be served by sen-
tencing,20 reducing the availability of indeterminate
sentences, 2' better defining the procedures to be followed
at sentencing (including provision for appellate review),22
and codifying the factors that should be considered aggra-
vating or mitigating in particular cases. 23 It is this last
proposal that generates the most concrete consequence of
Frankel's critique, for it is here that the concept of "guide-
lines" for sentencing first appears.
Frankel argued that the law, and not the preferences of
individual judges, should determine what factors are
material to the assessment of the severity of crimes, and
that the legislature therefore should "prescribe guidelines
for the application and assessment of these factors."24 "I
have in mind," Frankel says, "the creation eventually of a
detailed chart or calculus to be used (i) by the sentencing
judge in weighing the many elements that go into the sen-
tence; (2) by lawyers, probation officers and others
undertaking to persuade or enlighten the judge; and (3) by
appellate courts in reviewing what the judge has done."25
These guidelines should be formulated by a sentencing
commission, an expert administrative agency that should
study the field of sentencing and corrections, and enact
binding rules, "subject to traditional checks by Congress
and the courts. "26 And there we have it: the model of
guidelines and sentencing commissions that was to be
endorsed by the American Bar Association and the Ameri-
can Law Institute, adopted by a substantial number of
states, and most famously legislated by the federal Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984.
It is rare that an academic reform proposal has such a
far-reaching and fundamental impact on long-established
legal traditions.27 Moreover, Frankel was not only politi-
cally successful but also fundamentally correct both about
his critique of the system he observed in operation and
about the basic direction that reform should take. At the
same time, however, the style and rhetoric of Frankel's
book has something to do with the excesses that the sen-
tencing guideline movement created, particularly in the
federal system with which Frankel was most familiar, and
to which he devoted the greatest attention.
Despite those excesses, it seems to me unquestionable
that Frankel's basic point was right. One need not be a
critic of judges or of discretion to recognize that a system
that allows thousands of individual judges to make deci-
sions that will deprive people of their liberty within ranges
as wide as zero to ten or twenty-five years or beyond with-
out the slightest direction or guidance, without any further
review, and without even a requirement of giving reasons,
is not healthy. Such a system can create neither the
appearance nor the reality of fairness.
Such a system is also completely incompatible with the
existence of any coherent penal policy. One may not like
the direction that American penal policy has taken in the
generation since Frankel wrote. Frankel himself certainly
did not: he wrote of his "firm conviction that we in this
country send far too many people to prison for terms that
are far too long.... the United States probably has the
longest sentences by a wide margin of any industrialized
nation. " 2s He wrote that in 1972, when the total number of
incarcerated persons in the United States was well under
500,000.29 Today the number is over 2,300,000.30 But it
is impossible to have any penal policy at all if the officials
responsible for deciding who goes to prison and for how
long are randomly divided between "Maximum Johns" and
"Tum-'Em-Loose-Bruces," each free to pursue his or her
own preferred approach to criminology.
The same is true at the micro level of sentencing fac-
tors. As Frankel said, "It is a proposition of law to say that
pleading guilty, rather than insisting upon the right to
stand trial, will (or will not) be deemed a mitigating
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factor."3' That may be a question, like many other questions
about propositions of law, about which reasonable people
may disagree. But with most such questions, our approach
is and should be to debate the issue and then adopt by leg-
islation or common law the answer that appears best to an
authoritative decision maker with democratic legitimacy,
not simply to leave it to assorted putatively reasonable offi-
cials to adopt either answer as seems best to them at the
time.
Providing binding instructions on policy questions is
not incompatible with flexibility and a reasonable degree
of discretion. We can recognize that sentencing in individ-
ual cases involves a large number of variables, and seeks
to accomplish a number of not-always-compatible goals,
and still provide meaningful guidance to judges. Frankel
recognized this, noting that "'gravity of offense' does not
lend itself to weighing with the mechanical simplicity of
grocery or jewelers' scales."32 But this does not mean that
we should throw up our hands and provide no binding
instructions at all.
It is one thing to say that a judge needs the freedom to
assess factors that may be unique to particular cases and to
vary generally applicable principles to meet the needs of
particular cases. (Of course, to say this ought to imply, as
Frankel insisted, that the judge would have to explain her
rulings, and probably as well that the reasons given would
have to survive some degree of appellate scrutiny, like most
other decisions that judges make.) It is another to say that
different judges should be free to apply their own views of
whether imprisoning drug dealers for a long period of time
is desirable, or that when two judges agree that a particular
defendant should be treated leniently, it is perfectly OK for
one judge to think leniently means probation rather than
the one-year sentence he typically gives to offenders who
committed that crime, while the other thinks that leniency
is a matter of giving two years rather than the usual five.
The actual products of the sentencing guideline move-
ment have varied considerably in approach and success.
Some state guidelines, such as those in North Carolina,
have been widely hailed for bringing order and logic to
state sentencing, and even for sharply reducing prison pop-
ulations. Others, such as the Federal Guidelines, have been
criticized as unnecessarily rigid, unduly complex, and
extremely harsh. Judge Jon Newman, himself a wise judge
and thoughtful student of sentencing, defended Frankel in
these pages, shortly after his death, from responsibility for
the worst results of the movement he unleashed.33 Judge
Newman rightly pointed out that Frankel advocated
not a chart that would prescribe a precise sentence
range for every defendant, but] a "checklist of factors"
that would be relevant to sentencing and a very rough
assignment of values to grade at least some of the rel-
evant factors. For example, he suggested "that 'gravity
of the offense' could be graded along a scale from, per-
haps, I to 5." Wisely cautioning his readers not to
"accept delusions of precision," he pointed out "that
numerical statements may serve, for obviously non-
quantifiable subjects, as useful implements for
clarification of thought, comparisons, and criticism."
As an example, he referred to "[t]he physician who
speaks of a grade-three heart murmur": his meas-
urement might not be precise, "[b]ut he says a
meaningful thing that informs and guides others pro-
fessionally trained."34
While Judge Newman is right that Frankel's conception
of guidelines, only sketched in his book, appears to have
been rather more general and flexible than the eventual
Federal Guidelines became, I think it is too easy to absolve
Frankel from the charge that his book contributed sub-
stantially to the obsessive rigidity of some guidelines
regimes. Frankel's proposal for guidelines may have been
modest, but the excessive harshness of his rhetorical con-
demnation of judicial discretion encouraged the views of
those who came to believe that any flexibility or discretion
in a guideline system was an invitation to abuse, disparity,
and lawlessness.
Tongue firmly in cheek, Frankel purported to "yield
only to numerous judges in my admiration for those on
the bench."35 But his cool-eyed description of judges is
hardly flattering. Judges are poorly educated for purposes
of sentencing, selected for the most part "without concern
for any of the qualities supposedly wanted in suitable
judges,"36 offhand to the point of flippancy about the sen-
tencing process, arrogant, "[c]onditioned in the direction
of authoritarianism,37 and prone to abuses deriving from
their "moral or intellectual or physical deficiencies-or
from all together."38 He quotes others mourning the
"incompetency of certain types of judges to impose sen-
tences," or their "senility or a virtually pathological
emotional complex" that makes them "arbitrary or even
sadistic."39 Some of these qualities can indeed be found on
the bench, and Frankel is (for the most part) careful not to
universalize the more extreme aspects of his description.
But the picture that emerges from his fine advocate's hand
is something of a caricature. A reader can be forgiven for
emerging from his bracing rhetoric with the view that the
less these cruel, shallow, ignorant, and biased characters
have to do with sentencing, the better.
It is not simply that Frankel's criticism of judges is
excessive: he is right, after all, that judges, like other
human beings, are at best fallible and at worst horren-
dous, and that the whole point of the rule of law is that
such fallible creatures should not be vested with the
degree of discretion that characterized mid-twentieth-cen-
tury sentencing practice. The larger problem is that,
because he describes the potential abuses of the existing
system with such vividness and merely sketches his mod-
est proposals for reform, he makes no effort to analyze the
institutional and personal failings that may characterize a
guideline system.
If Frankel lacks illusions (to say the least) about judges,
he implicitly adopts the New Deal Democrat's bright-eyed
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naivet6 about administrative agencies. Taking sentencing
authority away from judges and vesting it instead in a bat-
tery of expert policy technicians, Frankel implies,
promises to usher in a brave new world of enlightened
policy and rational decision making. The potential for
political interference and excessive bureaucratization is
simply ignored. Should we really be surprised that at least
one such agency produced a body of guidelines that com-
bined the worst excesses of overregulated inflexibility with
the unbridled political exploitation of anticrime rhetoric to
produce rigid and extreme sentences?
Frankel's critique, persuasive as it is at the level of the-
ory, at the level of actual description is composed almost
entirely of ipse dixit and anecdote. I've been there, Frankel
says, and you can trust me that this is how it is, and if you
need evidence, here's a horror story or two. Fair enough in
a popular work, and hard to avoid even in more scholarly
precincts. It is devilishly difficult to quantify sentencing
disparity; the multitude of factors to be controlled for and
the extent of the tolerable variance make it difficult to
know exactly what we are measuring. Unless one radically
oversimplifies the task, thus begging the question to be
answered by assuming that only the most crudely measur-
able variables are assessed (a method too common among
those who seek to measure the degree to which judges are
.compliant" with sentencing guidelines), it is difficult to
devise accurate statistics on sentencing variation. And
since Frankel's point, after all, was that the total absence of
controls or even instructions could not help but generate
excessive disparity, there may have been no need for more.
But his critique of an entirely lawless system was too
easily taken as a mandate for an entirely nondiscretionary
system. It may do to dismiss concerns about "the defini-
tiveness of the evidence of disparity" (none of which
Frankel actually cites) as "the least substantial of
quibbles"40 if the issue is whether at least some guidance
should be provided. If the issue, however, is how much
control should be exerted, we need to know more about
the costs and benefits of different degrees of discretion
than Frankel provides.
Like many liberals of the time, moreover, Frankel was
also naive about the political direction that sentencing
reform was likely to take. As noted above, Frankel believed
that American penal practice, as it stood thirty-five years
ago, was excessively harsh. His favored quotations from
more extreme critics of the judiciary point to sadism and
cruelty rather than excessive softness. (Contemporary
politicians like Richard Nixon and George Wallace also
strongly criticized judges, but from a very different direc-
tion.) And his vivid specific anecdotes of abusive
sentencing almost always identify sentences or arguments
that resulted in overly harsh treatment of offenders.
Frankel's book is implicitly addressed to well-meaning lib-
erals who believe in the rule of law and assume that the
elimination of the reflexively punitive responses of a judi-
cial elite will usher in a more enlightened criminal justice
system.
It is hard to believe that Frankel could have been deaf
to the ways in which his harsh description of judges as out
of touch and incompetent to determine criminal justice
policy echoed the political themes of the Nixon and Wal-
lace presidential campaigns, with their claims that
coddling of criminals by activist judges was responsible
for an increase in crime. Frankel's view of the substance of
the errors made by judges may have been exactly opposite
to the views of the emerging conservative movement, but
his rhetorical attack on judicial discretion fit their agenda
perfectly. The results are plain to see. Increased political
control of sentencing policy has resulted in a far more
fiercely punitive criminal justice system than Frankel
could have imagined.
At the end of the day, however, Frankel's accomplish-
ment is real and lasting. No one today advocates a return
to the unbridled discretion and total indeterminacy that
characterized sentencing in the 195os and 196os. The
politicization of criminal justice policy has had unfortu-
nate results, with the proliferation of mandatory
minimum sentences, three-strikes laws, and rigidified
guidelines, but the guideline movement is at most only a
contributor to a political force that almost certainly would
have resulted in a harsher sentencing regime had
Frankel's reforms never been proposed or adopted. Judges,
after all, are less unpredictable, and more reliably reflec-
tive of social attitudes, than their critics imagine, and the
popular groundswell for tough responses to increased
crime from the 196os through the 198os would have
found an outlet one way or another. Democrats (with a
capital or a small d) ultimately cannot disagree that the
direction of penal policy ought ultimately to be made by
the democratic branches of government, and that judges
should not be free to disregard that policy.
The political and intellectual pendulum on sentencing
has to some extent begun to swing back from the extremes
that Frankel never advocated but that his rhetoric perhaps
encouraged. The severity of Frankel's critique, after all,
concerned a system that is gone forever. The bitterness
and extremity of that critique was perhaps necessary to call
attention to a serious but largely unacknowledged prob-
lem. If the momentum generated by that critique may
have helped propel the pendulum to the opposite extreme,
at least in the federal courts, perhaps it is time now to
recall the modesty of the "palliatives" that Frankel actually
advocated. It is now to be hoped that the federal system
has achieved, by somewhat awkward means, a sentencing
regime that combines genuine guidance with considerable
discretion.4' The system of advisory guidelines that
resulted from United States v. Booker42 may well be more
consistent with Frankel's vision of a simple checklist of
factors lacking in "delusions of precision"43 than the rigid
system of mandatory rules that actually resulted from his
initiative.- Perhaps it is time, moreover, to revisit the
strict renunciation of indeterminate sentencing that char-
acterizes federal law today. As Frankel recognized, while a
fully indeterminate system may have overestimated the
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role and the practicability of rehabilitation in sentencing,
extremely long sentences designed in substantial part to
protect the public from offenders believed dangerous and
incorrigible may well require a second look at some point,
to counteract the tendency at the time of sentencing to err
in the direction of protection, based on character assess-
ments and behavioral predictions that the passage of time
may call into question.
Certainly, we would all do well to listen to the voice of
compassion that questioned the American tendency to
respond with unthinking brutality to offenders. And
equally certainly, we can always benefit from Marvin
Frankel's all-too-rare ability to look beyond the self-con-
gratulatory acceptance of traditional practices and see
what we are actually doing, and how we could do it better.
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precursor of the rising school of young legal historians who
delve into such unusual material for micro-histories that
reveal the legal culture of a past time and place.
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accord with Frankel's argument for the government, that a
prize awarded to the winner of a symphonic composition
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9 Gary R Naftalis, A Tribute to Marvin Frankel, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1753, 1754 (2002).
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21 Id., at 108-11. Interestingly, Frankel does not argue for a totally
determinate regime, arguing only that where the legislative or
judicial purpose of a particular sentence is deterrence or retri-
bution, rather than incapacitation or retribution, "there should
be no occasion for an indeterminate sentence." Id., at 109. The
point is an important one that has been lost in much of the
sentencing debate: unless one completely rejects the protection
of the public from dangerous individuals or the hope of
reforming offenders as goals of criminal sentencing, the adop-
tion of an exclusively determinate system of punishment is no
more rational than the use of exclusively indeterminate sen-
tences in a system that recognizes that some punishment is
designed to serve purely punitive or deterrent goals.
22 Id., at 115-18.
23 Id., at 111-15.
24 Id., at 113.
25 Id., 113.
26 Id., 119. This last point is also one that federal and state sen-
tencing reforms appear to have missed. Unlike other
administrative agency regulations, the pronouncements of
the United States Sentencing Commission have not been
made subject to the usual review processes of administrative
law but have been exclusively under the control of Congress.
It is this escape from judicial review for consistency with the
broad outlines of the statute that, more than any other fea-
ture of the reform, has turned the Sentencing Commission
into what Justice Scalia derided as "a junior-varsity Con-
gress." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). It is also the heavy hand of political
control that has kept the Sentencing Commission from acting
like the independent, apolitical expert agency that New Deal
liberals like Frankel and Justice Breyer (both of whom taught
administrative law in their law professor days) anticipated.
27 The only comparable twentieth-century example is the Model
Penal Code, and that was the product of a century of agita-
tion for codification of the criminal law, capped by a massive,
decade-long project enlisting a large segment of the legal
and academic establishment to create a specific proposal to
respond to a long-acknowledged need. Frankel spoke only for
himself, about a problem that few had specifically articulated
before.
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See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Letting Guidelines Be Guidelines
(and Judges Be Judges), OSCJL AMICI: VIEWS FROM THE FIELD, at
http://osjcl.blogspot.com (January 2008), reprinted in 5(2)
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42 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
43 CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra, at 114.
44 Although Frankel himself opposed making the Federal Guide-
lines advisory, at least at a time when the Guidelines had not
yet completely remade the culture of the bench and bar, see
Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative
Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 2043, 2050 (1992), it is not clear
that he would be dissatisfied with the present regime. As the
modesty of his guideline proposal makes clear, Frankel was
less committed to some particular brand of sentencing
reform than he was urgent about the need for movement in
the direction of greater control of judicial discretion.
Whether a system of advisory guidelines, coupled with appel-
late review of sentences, a requirement of stated reasons for
deviation, and a culture in which numerical assessment of
sentencing factors is accepted by the judiciary, will prove
adequate to provide such control would surely for him have
been an empirical rather than a priori question.
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